Tag: Illinois

HOA attorney seeks homeowner arrest for not attending attorney fee meeting

In this instance, how does the court, in its obligation to do justice, determine if there has been dishonesty or grossly negligent behavior without an opportunity for the homeowner to examine the HOA’s affidavit?  Here, both judges protected the HOA as incapable of doing any evil, sua sponte (on its own).

Essentially, in my view, failing to allow the homeowner to question the signed affidavit of an HOA manager is not conducive to homeowner justice.  The liberal interpretation of the business judgment rule taken here is that, as I’ve indicated elsewhere, the board can do no wrong because average people become angels when they become an HOA board member.[1]

In order to understand the events in this situation leading to the request for the arrest of the homeowner for failing to attend a meeting, you need to understand the background of the case.  It’s lengthy, but needs to be read through.

Case History

The Arizona ALJ (Brian Brendan Tully) at OAH granted summary judgment (October 2012) for Terravita in regard to a request for minutes to an alleged executive meeting.[2] The order further states that the judge “concludes that . . . there are no issues contained in the Petition that require an evidentiary hearing.”  However, without an evidentiary hearing, where the homeowner could contest the allegation that it was indeed an executive meeting, the judge essentially took the word of the HOA’s attorney, the CAI member, Curtis Ekmark. In his discussion, the judge once again assumes the validity of Ekmark’s assertion that it was indeed an executive meeting, and argues that the homeowner did not show he had a legal right to executive minutes.

In Arizona, the court operates on a notice basis, that is, just give sufficient information that the complaint is valid, and then present your detailed evidence before the court.  That was not allowed in this case.

Homeowner filed superior court appeal[3] contesting the ALJ’s decision as “contrary to law, an abuse of discretion, arbitrary and capricious.”  

6. Administrative Law Judge Brian Brendan Tully’s October 4, 2012 Decision in 12F -H 12120 14-BFS, based exclusively upon certain “statements, claims and contentions (sic)” made by Respondent, Terravita Community Association, Inc., in its pleadings, denied Petitioner (Plaintiff) a hearing which would have brought forward the facts of the contested matter based upon evidence, witnesses’ sworn testimony and argument upon the merits of the matter’s facts and the planned community statutes relevant to those facts, instead, Tully vacated the matter from the calendar of the Office of Administrative Hearings.

 The homeowner further argued

 Plaintiff [homeowner] will timely request this Court hold an evidentiary hearing that will adduce evidence, present sworn witness testimony and offer argument in furtherance of the Court reversing the decision in 12F-H1212014-BFS and the agency’s action based upon the Court’s reviewing the administrative record (no hearing/no transcript) and evidence to be presented at an evidentiary hearing denied Petitioner at the OAH

Terravita’s relevant Answer was a reliance on the business judgment rule, which states that the court will defer the judgment of a corporation’s board as they know more than the judge.  In its reply to a request for an evidentiary hearing, Ekmark says homeowner must show the evidence that was already rejected by the ALJ as irrelevant.  (Remember the issue was a declaration that the meeting was an executive meeting and the ALJ didn’t want to hear anymore).   Ekmark concludes with, “Mr. Brown [homeowner] has had ample opportunities to present facts contrary to the Association’s position; yet, he has completely failed to do so.”  Did he???

Brown’s reply, beyond a criticism of Ekmark’s arguments about new evidence and failure to show evidence, got to the obvious legal question of the faithful acceptance of a statement without the right to a hearing on the validity of the statement:

[T]he presentation of evidence is necessary to the Court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law in furtherance of a just decision to include, but not limited to, the veracity of the affiant’s affidavit, an affidavit prepared under the supervision of  the Defendant-Appellee’s attorney, submitted with the Defendant-Appellee’s Answer (Pollock, a credentialed community manager, PCAM, CAAM, attended the March 27, 2012 meetings [Executive Session and Regular Meeting] of the board of directors and knew, or should have known, the “e-session” violated the planned community statutes).

However, the superior court appeal found no error and upheld the ALJ’s summary judgment decision.  “TCA has provided to this Court authorities and arguments in support of its position. This Court concludes the authorities and arguments provided by TCA are well-taken, and this Court adopts those authorities and arguments in support of its decision.”  (Judge McClennen of 11-22-2013). The judge apparently, like the ALJ, ignored the homeowner’s allegations.

Under R  Civ. P. 43(a), an affidavit is a written statement by a witness in lieu of the witness appearing in court in person. The opposing party must stipulate to the acceptance of an affidavit to be accepted by the court as evidence.  Rules of Evidence, Rule 609, allows for the impeachment of a witness. This did not allowed to occur here.

An appeal was filed by Brown on 7-14-2014, CA-CV14-0455, Div.1.

Arrest Warrant

Apparently, the HOA attorney firm of Ekmark & Ekmark wants their fees paid as per the court ruling. On August 8, 2014 it filed several documents with Judge McClennen for contempt of court for failing to submit to a subpoena to attend a debtor’s meeting (to discover how the attorney would collect its fees), and the arrest of Mr. Brown for contempt.  All over a question of the legitimacy of an executive board meeting.

According to the homeowner, who apparently did get access the Terravita’s financials and moneys spent on attorney fees for this litigation, the attorney fees amounted to $57,344.10.  Of course, the HOA has no cause for alarm since it won the case and does not have to pay this amount.  But, if it loses in the appellate court, what then?  HOA litigation is a gamble in favor of the HOA, and joy to the attorneys cause they get paid win or lose.

BTW, Judge McClennen washed his hands of jurisdiction on August 11, 2014 after receiving the filings from Ekmark.  “This Court no longer has jurisdiction and will take no further action in this matter.”

References

[1] Business judgment rule misinterpretation. In my commentary on the business judgment rule, Illinois appellate court awards punitive damages for reckless indifference by condo, I quoted the court’s reminder about what this rule means:

 “The rule protects directors who have been careful and diligent in performing their duties from being subjected to liability for honest mistakes of judgment. . . . [But where there is] evidence of bad faith, fraud, illegality, or gross overreaching, courts are . . . at liberty to interfere with the exercise of business judgment by corporate directors.”

 [2] Brown v. Terravita, No. 12F-H1212014-BFS, Administrative Law Judge Decision, Office of Administrative Hearings, October 4, 2012.

[3] Brown v. Terravita, LC2012-000699, Maricopa County.

Illinois appellate court awards punitive damages for reckless indifference by condo

Note:  This case is based on Illinois laws and case history precedent with respect to punitive damages and the business judgment rule.  (Normally, punitive damages are not awarded for breach of contract claims, but this case was a breach of fiduciary claim). I believe other states have similar laws and case history that would make this opinion valid in the respective states.  However, the decision is not for publication or use as binding precedent.

It reflects a common sense approach to justice under the law and not a decision to uphold the view that the HOA can do nothing wrong; and that the HOA always acts in the best interest of the HOA’s obligation to all the members.

Plaintiff must ask for punitive damages.

 

The issue:  Over a 2-year period, condo ignored homeowner’s repeated requests for assistance in addressing water damage, forcing homeowner to incur expenses to make repairs and to hire an attorney to seek condo reimbursement.  Punitive damages against the condo were sought.

The Laws:  Condo board’s breach of fiduciary duty;   punitive damages award for willful or evil motive or reckless indifference to rights of others; business judgment rule.

Decision:   Affirmed trial court decision against condo for breach of fiduciary duty to homeowner, and the award of punitive damages amounting to $22,000 above the damages of $5,497.

Discussion by the Court: 

“The purpose of punitive damages is not compensation, but punishment of the offender and deterrence of the wrongdoer and others. Punitive damages may be awarded ‘where the defendant’s conduct is willful or outrageous due to evil motive or a reckless indifference to the rights of others.’ “The parties agree that a trial court may award punitive damages in a breach of fiduciary duty case.

“[The trial court] found the Association ‘acted with reckless indifference to the rights and needs of [plaintiff] who was forced to use her own funds to repair an apartment and then hire a lawyer to help her recover her reasonable cost.’”

[Business judgment rule opinion].

“We note here that the Association urges us to find an abuse of discretion [judge overstepped his authority] because the award conflicts with its business judgment. ‘Under the business judgment rule [. . .] absent evidence of bad faith, fraud, illegality, or gross overreaching, courts are not at liberty to interfere with the exercise of business judgment by corporate directors.’

“The rule protects directors who have been careful and diligent in performing their duties from being subjected to liability for honest mistakes of judgment. . . . That is not what occurred in this case, where the Association was neither diligent nor careful in performing its duties, but instead chose to ignore the plight of  [plaintiff].”

Comment:  Punitive damages are the only realistic method whereby homeowner’s can impose a meaningful detriment to continued board abuse, as state laws do not punish the HOA board for violations of state laws or the governing documents.

 

Case:   Shuh v. Plaza Des Plaines Condominium Assn, No. 1-13-1999 (IL App. 1st  Dist. July 24, 201) (Thanks to HOA Member Services, “This website is designed to provide people with all the information they need to understand and enhance their experience of working with or living in a common interest development that is governed by a homeowners association.”)

 

 

Getting the Feds involved in HOA reforms

As apparent from the Illinois Supreme Court opinion[i] favoring HOAs, the Feds need to get involved. However, the Feds, like state attorney generals, have no specific authority to get involved – HOA/condo states are state laws, except for those federal laws like the American Disabilities Act and Fair Housing.

A broader approach is necessary in order to wake up the Feds, and that can come about by an appellate or US Supreme Court case decision on 1) violations of a homeowner’s constitutional rights, or 2) a violation of the 14th Amendment’s equal protection clause brought under federal law § 42 U.S.C. 1983, Civil action for deprivation of rights. This approach would be similar to the whistle blower law suits of Erin Brockovich or Jeffrey Wigand (tobacco nicotine is addictive).

Read the paper at constitutional rights . . . .

 

[i] See IL Supreme Court holds HOAs “are a creature of statute,” and not contractual.

IL Supreme Court holds HOAs “are a creature of statute,” and not contractual

Last month the IL Supreme Court opinion in Spanish Court[1] reversed the right of an owner to withhold assessments in view of the HOA’s failure to fix and maintain.[2] In its argument, frequently making use of pro-HOA activist and CAI CCAL attorney in Florida, Gary Poliakoff, the Court stated,

 

Although contract principles have sometimes been applied to the relationship between a condominium association and its unit owners based on the condominium’s declaration, bylaws, and rules and regulations . . . the relationship is largely a creature of statute, defined by the provisions of the Condominium Act. . . . Although these duties may also be reflected in the condominium declaration and bylaws, as they are in this case, they are imposed by statute and exist independent of the association’s governing documents. Accordingly, a unit owner’s obligation to pay assessments is not akin to a tenant’s purely contractual obligation to pay rent, which may be excused or nullified because the other party failed to perform. ¶ 21.

So much for the sanctity of the CC&Rs contract! The Court, guided not only by Poliakoff, but by a CAI amicus curiae brief,[3] rolls with the punches and chooses when and when not to uphold the contractual nature of the governing documents.

The Court avoided dealing with the equitable aspects of withholding assessments just like withholding rent, rejecting the favorable appellate decision that held,

[T]he obligation to pay assessments, and the obligation to repair and maintain the common elements, as mutually exchanged promises, and concluded that under principles of contract law, a material breach of the repair obligation could warrant nonpayment of assessments. ¶ 7.

Adding fuel to the fire, the Illinois Supreme Court followed the CAI propaganda that the HOA’s survival depends on assessments being paid immediately and without question.

This section [of the IL condo act] was adopted to provide a constitutionally permissible, quick method for collection of assessment arrearages. . . . The necessity of a “quick method” for collection of past due assessments, unencumbered by extraneous matters, is manifest when we consider the manner in which condominium associations operate . . . . the condominium form of property ownership only works if each unit owner faithfully pays his or her share of the common expenses. When a unit owner defaults in the payment of his or her assessments, the resulting forcible entry and detainer action is thus brought “for the benefit of all the other unit owners.” ¶¶ 29 -30.

Permitting a unit owner’s duty to pay assessments to be nullified would thus threaten the financial stability of condominium associations throughout this state. . . . For the same reason that taxpayers may not lawfully decline to pay lawfully assessed taxes because of some grievance or claim against the taxing governmental unit, a condominium unit owner may not decline to pay lawful assessments. Trustees of the Prince Condominium Trust v. Prosser, 592 N.E.2d 1301.” ¶ 32.

 

Here we have the alleged dicta [non-supported court opinions], and becoming part of the Illinois public policy, that the survival of the HOA/condo is first and foremost. The HOA rises to the same level as a public entity, with the questionable governing documents now having contractual validity and court support to deny homeowner rights, freedoms, privileges and immunities.

 

Welcome to the New America of HOA-Land.

References

 

[1] http://www.state.il.us/court/Opinions/SupremeCourt/2014/115342.pdf.

[2] See appellate decision Court decisions: HOA Enlightenment Movement vs. the Dark Ages.

[3] “Spanish Court Condominium Association II vs. Carlson (Illinois),” CAI Amicus Curiae Activity 2013.

HOAs with police powers: sliding down the slippery slope to HOA-Land

In State of NC v. Weaver[1] an HOA security officer stopped a driver on the suspicion of speeding within the HOA grounds.  Even though there were almost identical circumstances in Poris v. Lake Holiday[2] – uniforms, patrol car marked “Metro Public Safety,” and flashing lights – where the Illinois court held that security agents had the right to stop and detain drivers, the state in this appeal argued that the security officer was not a state agent. 

 The HOA authorized the security officers “to issue civil citations and fines to anyone on the property who violated the rules and regulations of the community (fines to be collected by a debt collector).  Note the broad grant of power to the security officers to fine and collect debt from non-members (the question of public streets remains unknown).  Therefore, it should not be surprising that the trial court had held:  “1. The armed security guard . . . [a]cted as an agent for the State[.]; 2. The armed security guard is a State actor.”[3]

 In reply, the State argued that:  “a traffic stop conducted entirely by a nonstate [emphasis added] actor is not subject to reasonable suspicion because the fourth amendment does not apply.”  In other words, while a cop had to have had a good suspicion that a crime was committed in order to stop and detain, it did not pertain to the security agent who was not a state agent, and constitutional protections did not apply as it does not apply to the HOA contract in general.

The question of whether or not the officer was acting under HOA orders was avoided, thus not allowing the question of HOAs as state actors to be entertained.   Questions like: Was the HOA’s authority to have its security agency act with civil police powers – stop and detain – constitutional?  Was the HOA, itself, a state actor?[4]

Where did the HOA get such authority? Certainly not by delegation from the NC legislature as required by law even for the creation of state agencies.  (In Arizona, constitutionality challenges were mounted by CAI attorneys questioning the authority of the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH) to adjudicate HOA disputes).

But, this constitutionality issue was not the question before the court, but should have been as it pertained to the legality of the initial stop and detain act by the security officer.

The appellate court maintained that there was no evidence that the officer was acting to assist bona fide law enforcement officers or was asked by them for assistance.  However, it ignored its own acknowledged fact that the officer detained the defendant when  he smelled alcohol and “asked defendant to “step out of [the] vehicle and have a seat on the . . . sidewalk[.]”

The appellate court also ignored the trial court finding, which was not challenged by the State, that: “No Longer was he performing under Metro’s contract. After issuing the civil citation his actions exceeded his contractual authority. His goal and purpose evolved into detaining [d]efendant until local law enforcement arrived.” Was this a legitimate citizen’s arrest?

And what if the officer was acting under contract?  Then what?  Not addressed.

The appellate court dismissed the findings that the HOA security officer was a state actor and the case goes back to the trial court to decide its merits.  Namely, as a private citizen did the officer unconstitutionally stop and detain the defendant?  Poris said no. Federal court decisions on Arizona’s SB 1070 immigration laws put a strong damper on even police stopping and detaining citizens. 

So, where do we go from here?    Hopefully to answer the question of the HOA’s authority to act with police powers, a power confined to civil, not private, government.

 

 References

 

[1] State of NC v. Weaver, NO. COA13-578 (NC App. 12-13-2013). This appeal centered on the trial court’s granting of a motion to suppress evidence in the DUI case, because the security officer was a state actor.  It does not consider the very important issue of HOAs as state agents. The defendant was represented in the appeals case by NC’s version of a public defender.

[2] See in general, Corporatism in America: IL Supreme Court grants HOA police powers to arrest and detain.

[3] A ‘state actor’ can be defined simply as ‘an arm of the state’ as if it were a public agency or entity.  As such, the HOA would then be subject to 14th Amendment restrictions that protect your rights.  See Do state HOA Statutes Establish HOAs as State Actors?